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STATEMENT OF CASE 
Dr. Christian Shull is a reservist in the United States ~ r m y . '  In late January 2007, he was 
called to active duty for a period of 365 days beginning on February 26,2007.' At the time of his 
deployment Dr. Shull's medical practice, Snake River Oncology (SRO), leased space from Climax, 
LLC. The Servicemember's Civil Relief Act (SCRA), allows service members to terminate a lease, 
at their option, any time after receipt of orders to deploy with a military unit for a period of not less 
than ninety (90) days.3 It is undisputed that Defendants, Dr. Shull and SRO, properly gave notice 
of their lease termination on April 26, 2007. The effective date of the termination was May 30, 
2007. 
The SCRA allows that termination ofthe lease may be modified as justice and equity require, 
if the lessor applies for such relief before the termination date provided in the written notice? The 
Plaintiff, filed breach of contract claims and arequest for a declaratoryjudgment on May 27,2009. 
On November 19,2007 Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint petitioning for a modification of the 
lease termination under the SCRA . 
Plaintiff's Amended Complaiilt alleged as the basis for a modificatioil of the lease that Dr. 
Shull Suffered no "undue hardship" as a result of his call to military ~ervice .~ Thereafter, Plaintiff 
'clerk's Exhibits, Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment November 17, 2008,. Ex. A. Deposition ofChristian Shull, M.D., October 5,2007, 13:6 - 14:21. 
 hull Oct. Depo., 19:10 - 23:3. 
3 5 ~  App. U.S.C. $ 535 
4 ~ d  535(g) 
R. Vol. I, pp. 63-4, W 24-3 1. 
pursued a course of discovery and litigation focused solely on the finances of Defendants prior to 
and after invoking their right to terminate the lease. 
Plaintiff moved for summary judgment on October 3 1, 2009, arguing that Defendants had 
suffered no undue hardship due to the call to duty and that Defendants had adequate income to pay 
their  expense^.^ Defendants responded that a service member's lack of "undue hardship" is not a 
proper factor for equitable relief and that they invoked protection under the Act to prevent business 
competitors from taking advantage of Dr. Shull's deployment to Dr. Shull's detriment. 
The trial court issued its Opinion, Decision, and Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment on June 30, 2009.7 The court determined that: I) the SCRA does not require that service 
member's show undue hardship to enjoy the benefit of § 535, 2) a court of equity must exercise 
extreme caution i~~withholding the protection of the Act, 3) the Act intends to benefit service 
members even if some harm occurs to lessors and this alone did not create a basis for equitable 
relief,* and 4) Plaintiff had not presented otherwise sufficient grounds to invoke equity, such as 
mutual mistake, fraud, or impossibility. On May 15, 2009, the district court issued its Final 
Judgment clarifying that its opinion on Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment addressed all legal 
and factual issues and intended to dispose of the entirety of the case. 
'~1erk.s Exhibits, Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, October 31,2008, pp. 12-15. 
7 ~ .  Voi. I, pp. 11 1-121. 
81d, 
Plaintiff now appeals the Court's finding and argues that the Court required a showing of 
fraud as a basis for equitable relief.g 
STATEMENT OF PACTS 
Dr. Shull, an oncologist practicing in Idaho Falls, Idaho, is also a reservist with the United 
States Army and has been called to active duty two times between 2004 and 2007.'0 Each call to 
active duty required that Dr. Shull deploy to a military facility and provide medical care to service 
members." During his 2004 call to duty, Dr. Shull was employed by another Idaho Falls, oncologist, 
Dr. Kevin P. Mul~ey . '~  On the day following his return from active duty in Germany, Dr. Shull was 
released from his employment with Dr. Mulvey. Dr. Shull believed that his termination was directly 
related to his call to active duty.I3 
Dr. Shull thereafter began his own practice, SRO, co-defendant here.14 SRO entered a five 
year lease, personally gauranteed by Dr. Shull, with Plaintiff, onNovember 18,2004.15 The monthly 
rent for the facility was $5,408.50 per month, but the lease called for reduced payments between 
December 2004 and November 2005.16 Between November 2005 and November 2006 the 
9~ppellant's Brief, p. 15 
'Oshull Oct. Depo.,15:9 - 25:14 
" ld. 
'2~hull  Oct. Depo., 33% - 36:7 
I 3 ~ d .  
14 Shull Oct. Depo, 36:5 - 13. 
"clerk's Exhibits, Affidavit of B.J. Driscoll, Ex. A, Lease Agreement. 
"~lerk 's  Exhibits, Affidavit of B.J. Driscoll, Ex. A, Lease Agreement, Exhibit F, Optional Rent Payment 
Schedule. 
previously reduced amounts were repaid to Plaintiff in the form of additional rental payments.17 
Thereafter lease payments returned to the base figure.'' 
In October 2006, Dr. Shull received notice for his second call to duty." Dr. Shull attempted 
to find another doctor to join his practice during the call to duty." Dr. Shull was not able to recruit 
another physician, but was able to postpone his call to service." 
Soon after January 26,2007, Dr. Shull received another call to duty, this time requiring that 
he report by February 26, 2007.'' Dr. Shull then successfully recruited Dr. Ed Wos to join his 
pra~tice.'~ Although, Plaintiff refers to Dr. Wos as a pro tem physician, Dr. Wos was given a 
contract for one year with the expectation that Dr. Wos would remain with the pra~tice.'~ 
Afler bringing a third oncologist, Dr. Wos, into the Idaho Falls market, Dr. Shull was 
approached by his former employer Dr. M u l ~ e y . ~ ~  Dr. Mulvey asserted that Dr. Shull had altered 
the market share for oncologists in Idaho Falls hastening Dr. Mulvey's desire to sell his practice.26 
Dr. Mulvey represented that if Dr. Shull did not purchase his practice, that Dr. Mulvey would recruit 
a fourth oncologist to the market to grow into Dr. Mulvey's practice until that fourth oncologist was 
"ld. 
"ld, 19:lO -23:3. 
23~d,, 29:15 - 3 2 5 .  
241d. 
25 Clerk's Exhibits, Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment November 17,2008,. Ex. B. Deposition of Christian Shull, M.D., July 11,2008, 162:17 - 167:18. 
2'61d 
in a position to purchase the practice outright2' Dr. Shull testified that he believed the market limit 
for oncologists in Idaho Falls was two, that three oncologist strained the market, and that if it 
expanded to four, at least one would fail.'* Dr. Shull therefore agreed to purchase Dr. Mulvey's 
practice. 
On April 26,2007, Dr. Shull provided Climax notice of his intent to vacate the lease with 
Climax effective May, 30,2007. On May 23,2007, Climax filed suit claiming breach of contract 
and requested damages equal to the remaining lease payments.29 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Idaho applies an abuse of discretion standard to cases in equity. This standard was recently 
discussed by this Court in the case Justadv. Ward, 2009 Ida. LEXIS 97,211 P.3d 118, (June 2009). 
In Justad, this Court determined, 
Imposition of an equitable remedy requires a balancing of the equities, which is 
inherently a factual determination; therefore, the district court's imposition of such 
a remedy should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. West Wood Invs., Inc. v. 
Acord, 141 Idaho 75,82,106 P.3d 401,408 (2005). A trial court does not abuse its 
discretion if it (1) correctly perceives the issue as discretionary, (2) acts within the 
bounds of discretion and applies the correct legal standards, and (3) reaches the 
decision through an exercise of reason. Id. (citing Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. 
v. Texas Rejnery Corp., 139 Idaho 761,768,86 P.3d 475,482 (2004)). 
Review of a trial court's conclusions from a bench trial is limited to ascertaining 
whether the evidence supports the findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact 
support the conclusions of law. Benninger v. DeriJield, 142 Idaho 486,488-89,129 
27~d. 
2 8 ~ d  168:12 - 170:18. 
29 R. Vol. I, pp. 9 - 13. 
P.3d 1235,1237-38 (2006) (citingAlumet v. Bear Lake Grazing Co., 119 Idaho 946, 
949, 812 P.2d 253, 256 (1991)). Since it is the province of the trial court to weigh 
conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility of the witnesses, this 
Court will liberally construe the trial court's findings of fact in favor of the judgment 
entered. Rowley v. Fuhrman, 133 Idaho 105, 107, 982 P.2d 940, 942 (1999). This 
Court will not set aside a trial court's findings of fact unless the findings are clearly 
erroneous. Ransom v. Topaz Mktg,, L.P., 143 Idaho 641,643, 152 P.3d 2,4 (2006); 
I.R.C.P. 52(a). If the trial court based its findings on substantial evidence, even if the 
evidence is conflicting, this Court will not overturn those findings on appeal. 
Benningeu, 142 Idaho at 489, 129 P.3d at 1238. This Court will not substitute its 
view of the facts for that of the trial court. Ransom, 143 Idaho at. 643, 152 P.3d at 4. 
However, this Court exercises free review over matters of 1awBolger v. Lance, 137 
Idaho 792, 794, 53 P.3d 121 1, 1213 (2002) (citing Bouten Constr. Co. v. H.F. 
Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho 756,760,992 P.2d 751,755 (1999)). 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL 
1. Whether Plaintiff failed to appeal a finding of the trial court? 
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying equitable relief? 
3. Are Defendants entitled to attorney fees on appeal? 
ARGUMENT 
1. Whether Plaintiff failed to ameal a finding of the trial court? 
Plaintiff posits an inaccurate issue for appeal, stating "the Trial Court erroneously imposed 
a fraud standard where none existed.""' The trial court did not impose any single standard for 
equitable relief, but instead noted that Plaintiff failed to present "a compelling argument for this 
coni-t to exercise its equitable protection and withhold the protection of the ~ c t . " ~ '  It appears that 
3 0 ~ p p e l l ~ ~ t 3 s  Brief, p. 15. 
3 1 ~ .  VOI. I, p. 119. 
Plaintiff misreads the trial court's ruling to infer a requirement of fraud. This, however, was not the 
case. 
The only basis for "justice and equity" presented to the trial court was whether a service 
member's financial health, or laclc of hardship, provided sufficient grounds for equitable relief.3' 
The trial court considered and rejected this argument, finding that a benefit to the service member 
or a loss to the lessor, is not a sufficient basis for equitable modification as that will always be the 
outcome when 5 535 is inv01ced.~~ Because the trial court found that the financial gain or loss that 
necessarily flows from an invocation of5 535 was not a sufficient basis for equitable relief, the court 
looked at other potential factors, specifically noting that, "equitable remedies are not dependent on 
contractual or statutory schemes, hut exist because no remedy is available at law 'and because 
sufficient grounds to invoke equity such as mutual mistake, fraud, or impossibility exist."'34 
The trial court did not, contrary to Plaintiffs contentions, require an affirmative showing of 
fraud. To the contrary, the court merely noted additional factors which could be considered. Having 
ruled on Plaintiffs sole contention, the court clarified that there were no allegations which might 
otherwise form the basis of an equitable claim, such as fraud or that Dr. Shull entered the military 
service for the sole purpose of shirking his obligations under the lea~e . '~  Because the trial court did 
require a showing of fraud, Plaintiff does not present an issue for appeal. 
32~lerk's Exhibits, Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, October 31,2008, pp. 12-15. 
3 3 ~ .  Vol. I, p. 118. 
340pinion at 8 (citing Holscher v. James, 124 Idaho 443,447 (1993)). 
3 5 ~ .  Vo1. I, p. 118. 
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denving equitable relief. 
On its face, Plaintiffs brief appears to have misstated the order of the Court and fails to raise 
a valid issue for appeal. In an exercise of caution, Defendants supply the following arguments in the 
event that Plaintiffs brief is interpreted to challenge the Court's equitable findings. 
Only rarely have appellate courts interpreted the SCRA, particularly 5 535. In fact, although 
5 535 was enacted in 1942, neither party has identified a single case where a service members' right 
to lease termination was modified. A decision by this court, which for the first time limits a service 
members ability to terminate his lease upon a call to service, will be reviewed exhaustively by sister 
jurisdictions. 
Service members face the constant threat of a call to duty. Many, like Dr. Shull, endure 
multiple deployments within a few years. These service members, poor and rich alike, rely on 5 535 
for certainty in their lives. Some will choose to terminate their leases, and all that do, will do so 
because it benefits them. That is the purpose of the SCRA, to relieve service members so that their 
"energies may be devoted to [their] military duties, unhampered by mental di~tress."~"enying 
protection under the Act, based solely on a Defendants' financial means, would establish precedent 
encouraging needless litigation by landlords unhappy with the Acts protections. Such precedent 
would be contrary to the plain and unambiguous language of the Act. 
3 6 ~ .  Vol. I, p. 118 (citing Omega industries Inc. v. Raffaele, 894 R. Supp. 1425, 1434 (1995); see also, 
Patrikes v. J C H .  Service Stations, Inc., 41 N.Y.S. 2d 158, 165 (1943)). 
The trial court recognized the SCRA's benefit to service members generally, and the benefit 
to Dr. Shull in particular, in applying its equitable discretion to deny a modification of the lease 
termination. The trial court first recognized that "SCRA 5 535 does allow the court to modify any 
relief granted under the section as equity and justice require."37 Recognizing its equitable power, the 
court also noted that "'[b]ecause this policy is to be liberally construed, a court of equity must 
exercise extreme caution in withholding the protection of [of the Act]."'38 The trial court then 
addressed the only basis for equitable relief presented by Plaintiff, that Plaintiff did not recover the 
lease payments which it alleges Defendants were financially able to pay. The court noted that "this 
reality reflects the very nature and purpose of the Act. As the Omega and Patrikes courts noted, the 
purpose of this legislation was to relieve servicemembers of the mental strain of financial frustrations 
so that their 'energies may be devoted to [their] military duties, unhampered by mental distress."'" 
Having weighed the equitable considerations, including the loss of resources to Plaintiff and 
the benefit to Dr. Shull in allowing "him to focus his attention on treating ill service members in a 
time of war," the trial court determined that Plaintiff had "not presented a compelling argument for 
this court to exercise its equitable discretion and withhold the protection of the ~ c t . " ~ '  Thus, the 
trial court(1) correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, (2) acted within the bounds of discretion 
3 7 ~ .  Vol. I, p. 117. 
38 R. Vol. I, p. 118 (citing Omega, 894 F. Supp. at 1434 (citing Virginia Railway Co. v. System Federation 
No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937)). 
"R. Vol. I, p. 118 (Omega, 894F. Supp. at 1434, (Patrikes, 41 N.Y.S. at 165). 
4 0 ~ .  Vol. I, p. 119 (emphasis added). 
and applied the correct legal standards, and (3) reached the decision through an exercise of reason. 
The trial court properly acted within its equitable discretion and should be upheld upon appeal?' 
A. Plaintiffs theory would deny reviewing courts discretion to invoke or withhold 
eauity, andreauire that alease be modified whenever aservicemember benefits from 
the lease termination. 
Plaintiff alleges no wrongful act by Defendants other than receiving the benefit afforded to 
them by § 535. As noted by the trial court, Plaintiff made no allegation of fraud, mutual mistake, 
or impos~ibility.~~ Plaintiff presented no evidence in furtherance of any established doctrine of 
equitable relief. Nor did Plaintiff allege that Dr. Shull entered military service for the purpose of 
invoking the lease termination statute or that he induced Plaintiffs reliance, to Plaintiffs detriment, 
knowing that he intended to invoke the Act. Simply put, Dr. Shull was called to service on the 
orders of the United States Army. Defendants were then forced to make a series of business 
decisions, and realized a benefit by invoking protections under the Act. Plaintiff seeks to deny 
Defendants that benefit on the allegation that Defendants did not suffer severe financial harm prior 
to invoking their right?3 
4' Wert Woodlnvs., inc. v. Acord, 141 Idaho 75, 82, 106 P.3d 401,408 (2005) (citing Sun Valley Potato 
Growers, Inc. v. Texas ReJinev Corp., 139 Idaho 761,768, 86 P.3d 475,482 (2004)). 
4 2 ~ .  Vo1. I, p. 118. 
" Plaintiff acknowledged in its Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment that Defendants 
suffered lost profits from a reduced number of new patient refe~rals, and that this reduced cash flow Lasted at least 
three months. Clerk's Exhibits, Brief Sup. Sum. Judg., 6. 
At summary judgment, Plaintiff acknowledged Defendants' absolute right to terminate the 
lease under the SCRA.44 Plaintiff also acknowledged that the right to termination was not 
conditioned on a showing of material effect4' In other words, Defendants had a right to cancel the 
lease whether or not Dr. ShulI suffered an undue hardship from his call to service. Yet, Plaintiff 
repeatedly argued that the lease termination should be modified based solely on whether the 
Defendants suffered an undue hardship caused by Dr. Shull's call to ser~ice.4~ Plaintiff closed its 
brief for summary judgment by stating, "Shull did not employ the lease termination provision of the 
SCRA 'to prevent or remedy any undue hardship resulting to [him]' or from 'his inability to meet 
his  obligation^."'^^ Plaintiff argues that if a service member does not suffer "undue hardship" then 
equity should deny him his legal protection. Such a standard does not free a service member to 
44~lerk's Exhibits, Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion for Bench Trial, 
November 21,2008, p. 3. 
"1d 
46~lerks Exhibits, Brief, Sup. Sum Judg, pp. 12-15. 
47~ierk's Exhibits, Brief Sup. Sum. Judg. 15, citing Patrikes v. J C N  Service Stations, Inc., 41 N.Y.S. 2d 158, 
165 (19432. 
Plaintiffs reliance upon this single basis for recovexy is set forth in briefmg in support of Plaintiffs Motion for 
Protective Order. In its motion for protective order, Plaintiffargued, "Climax' financial information is irrelevant to the 
determination of the main issue in this case, namely whether Defendants suffered any undue hardship from Christian 
Shull, M.D.'s three month absence for military service. If the Defendants suffered no undue hardship, then this court 
should grant Climax relief E~om the lease termination as justice and equity require." (R. Vol. 1, pp. 82-83), Appellant 
again stated their view of the relevant evidence in Appellant's Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Protective order. 
Therein Appellant stated, "[tlhe issue this court must decide is whether the defendants suffered undue hardship from 
Shull's three-month military absence. If Defendants suffered an undue hardship from Shull's absence, then justice and 
equity may not require any modification of the lease termination. However if the Defendants suffered no undue hardship 
from Shull's absence, thenjustice and equity will not condone the avoidance of defendants' obligations under the lease 
just so that Shull could expand his medical practice and leave Climax with the unpaid debt." (R. Vol. I, p. 92) 
concentrate on his call to duty but requires that he not settle his affairs until the wolves are at the 
door. 
SERVICEMEMBERS CIVIL RELIEF ACT. 
Plaintiffs theorv for equitable relief is based upon a series of cases apvlving an entirely 
different statulorv scheme. 
The first enactment of what is now the SCRA was entitled the Soldier and Sailor Relief Act 
of 1918.49 It was therafter re-enacted in 1940 and 1942 and titled the Soldier and Sailor's Civil 
Relief Act (SSCRA).50 In many respects the 1940 enactment followed the Soldier and Sailor Relief 
Act of 1918.51 
Sections of the SSCRA first enacted in 191 8 and interpreted in Appellant's Brief on Appeal, 
contained a "material effect" provision. Material effect provisions required a showing that the 
service member's call to duty effected his ability to meet his obligations. Plaintiff cites to the cases 
Boone v. Lightner, 3 19 U.S. 561 (1943), Franklin Soc. for Home-Building and Savings v. Flavin, 
265 A.D. 720 (NY 1943) and Dietz v. Truepel, 184 A.D. 448 O\iY 1918).52 Each of these cases 
interprets a section of the then SSCRA that contained a material effect provision.53 In those sections 
49~oone v.Lightner, 319 U.S. 561,568-69 (1943). 
50rd 
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52~pbellants' Brief on Appeal, pp. 19-20. 
53~oone,  319 U.S. at 565 (interpreting then 50 U.S.C. App. 520); Franklin, 25 A.D. at 721 (interpreting 
then 50 U.S.C. App. 521, 532); Dietz v. Truepel, 184 A.D. 448 (NY 1918) (interpreting then 50 U.S.C. App. 532) 
"material effect" is a precondition, and failure to show that it has been met denies all benefit under 
that section. For instance, former $ 521 was quoted in Boone as follows: 
At any stage thereof any action or proceeding in any court in which a person in military 
service is involved, either as plaintiff or defendant, during the period of such service or 
within sixty days thereafter may, in the discretion of the court in which it is pending, on its 
own motion, and shall, on application to it by such person or some person on his behalf, be 
stayed as provided in this Act, unless, in the opinion of the court, the ability of plaintiff 
to prosecute the action or the defendant to conduct his defense is not materially affected 
by reason of his military service.54 
In its brief to this Court, Plaintiff quotes liberally from the legislative history cited in the 
Boone case.55 The legislative history is irrelevant to the proceedings here as &one Court's stated 
purpose was to interpret the section's "material effect" provision.56 The Boone Court noted, 
Canons of statutory construction admonish us that we shonld not needlessly render as 
meaningless the language which, afler authorizing stays, says "unless, in the opinion 
of the court, the ability of plaintiff to prosecute the action or the defendant to conduct 
his defense is not materially affected by reason of his military service. 
The Act of 1940 was a substantial reenactment of that of 1918. The 
legislative history of its antecedent shows that this clause was deliberately chosen 
and that judicial discretion thereby conferred on the trial court instead of rigid and 
undiscriminating suspension of civil proceedings was the very heart of the policy of 
the Acts7 
The Boone Court continued, "The clause 'unless, in the opinion of the court, the ability of the 
defendant to conlply with the judgment or order sought, is not materially affected by reason of his 
54~oone, 3 19 U.S. at 564-65. 
55~ppellants' Brief, pp. 19-20 
56 Boone, 319 U.S. at 569 
57~d. at 568-69 . 
military service,' is the ltey to the whole scheme of the bill."58 The Supreme Court noted, "The Act 
. . . requires only that the court be of opinion that ability to defend is not materially affected by 
niilitary ~ervice."'~ Simply put, the Couri required a finding of hardship because that is what the 
language of those sections of the Act required. 
Plaintiff also cites to Dietz v. Truepel, for what it presents as general propositions regarding 
the then SSCRA. However, the court in Dietz also interpreted, and was bound by, a section of the 
SSCRA containing a "material effect" The Dietz court expressly stated, "That is the 
criterion under the Act of Congress. The stay shall be granted 'unless in the opinion of the court the 
ability of the defendant to comply with the terms of the obligation is not materially affected by 
reason of his military ~ervice."'~' The Dietz court then denied the service member relief based upon 
the statutory requirement to show "material effect" to obtain relief under the "While the courts 
will protect the men engaged in the service of the nation fiom loss in legal proceedings brought 
about by their absence in service, the papers should show that the threatened injury is due to their 
service and consequent inability to protect their interests, and this is the plain direction of the Act 
of C o n g r e ~ s . " ~ ~  The hardship requirement was the "plain direction" of Congress simply because 
Congress had inserted a "material effect" provision in the section at issue. 
581d at 569 
59~ci at 57 1. 
60~nterpreting then 50, App., $ 532 
6 ' ~ i e t z  v. Truepel, 184 A.D. 448 (NY 1918). 
6 2 ~ d  at 450. 
63~d, 
Section 535 has a separate legislative histow and statutow pumose than the provisions cited 
by Plaintiff. 
The SSCRA was enacted in October 1 9 4 0 . ~ ~  In many respects it followed the Soldier and 
Sailor Relief Act of 1918.65 In 1942, Congress formed a special committee in response to several 
bills seeking to amend the 1940 Act." The committee was assisted by Maj. William D. Partlow, Jr. 
of the Judge Advocate General's Department of the ~ r m y . ~ ~  The special committee held numerous 
I hearings with interested parties prior to presenting its draft to the hi1 Committee on Military 
At the time of the 1942 amendments, Congress was very familiar with the "materially 
affected" provisions and knew to include that language where it intended to condition pmtection 
under the Act on a showing of hardship. As Major Partlow testified before the full committee: 
You left it in such a way, sir, which I have tried to follow out in drafting these 
amendments, of limiting nearly all of them to the ability of the person to discharge 
the obligation; whether or not his ability to pay has been impaired materially by 
reason of his military service. Except in this section, as Mr. Elston has mentioned, 
there is no limitation there as to the impairment of his ability to discharge the 
obligation, with reference to his right of cancellation of the lease. And the theory 
behind it, as I just stated, is that he still not able to enjoy that property. 
The Chairman. That is right. 
Major Partlow. And therefore this would give him the right to cancel the lease.69 
6477 Cong. Rec. 5363(1942). 
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la. 
"A Bill to Amend The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil ReliefAct of 1940 to Extend the Relief and Benefits 
Provided Therein to Certain Persons, to Iizclude Certain Addiiional Proceedings and Transactions Therein, To 
Provide Further Relief for Persons in Militaiy Service, to Change Certain Insurance Provisions Thereof; and for 
Committee members specifically debated situations in which the service member suffered 
no hardship prior to invoking the Act.70 Had congress intended the service members relief be 
conditioned upon a sharing of hardship, it would have drafted 8 535 with amaterial effect provision. 
Following debate within the committee, the lease termination provision was enacted as one 
of the few SSCRA provisions without a "material affect" requirement. 
Plaintiffs arguments were reiected bv the United States Suvreme Court in Conrov v. 
Aniskoff 507 U.S. 51 1 (1993). 
Plaintiffs argument that a service member must suffer undue hardship to be entitled to 
protection under sections of the SCRA not containing a "material effect" provision was rejected by 
the United States Supreme Court in Coizroy v. Arziskofl507 U.S. 5 1 1 ( 1  993). In Conroy, the Court 
was asked to read a hardship provision into then 8 525 of the SSCRA. The respondent in Conroy 
argued that when $ 525 was read in the context of the entire statute, it implicitly conditioned its 
protections on a demonstration of hardship or prejudice resulting from military service?' The 
respondent in Conroy argued this interpretation based upon: (I) the legislative history of the Act; (2) 
that other provisions of the Act were expressly conditioned on a showing of prejudice; and (3) that 
a literal interpretation of the Act, allowing invocation without a showing of hardship, produced an 
illogical or absurd result.7z 
Other Purposes; Hearings on H.R. 7029 Before the Commiitee on Military Affairs House of Representatives, 77'" 
Cong., 2" Sess. (1942). 
"O Id at 24-25 
7 '~onroy ,  507 U.S. at 514 
72~d .  
The Supreme Court rejected a reading of the Act that interjected the prejudice requirement 
into all of the SSCRA's provisioi~s.'~ The Court noted that as early as 1925, in Ebert v. Poston, 266 
U.S. 548 (1925), it had interpreted and applied each provision of the Act ~eparately .~~ The Court 
went on to recognize that the statutory framework of the SSCRA, which contained a prejudice 
requirement in some sections and not in others, demonstrated that Congress meant what it said in 
the individual sections.75 The Court stated, 
[Tlhe context ofthis statute actually supports the conclusion that Congress ineant what 5 525 
says. Several provisions of the statute condition the protection they offer on a showing that 
military service adversely affected the ability to assert or protect a legal right. To choose one 
of many examples, 3 532(2) authorizes a stay of enforcement of secured obligations unless 
'the ability of the defendant to comply with the terms of the obligation is not materially 
affected by reasons of his military service.' The comprehensive character of the entire 
statute indicates that Congress included a prejudice requirement whenever it 
considered it appropriate to do so, and that its ommission of any such requirement in 
5 525 was deliberate?' 
Thus, Congress has clearly indicated, in the individual sections of the SCRA, whether the sections 
protections are conditioned upon a showing of undue hardship. 
Section 535 provides that, "the lessee on a lease. . . may, at the lessee's option, terminate the 
lease at any time after, (1) the lessee's entry into military service; or (2) the date of the lessee's 
military orders..."77 There is no language within 9 535 limiting the right to termination upon a 
73~%. at 515-16. 
74 Conroy v. AniskofJ; 507 U.S. 511,  519 (1993); (Ebert v. Poston, 266 US. 548 (1925), 
751d. at 515-16. 
761%. (emphasis added). 
7 7 5 ~  p p .  U.S.C. § 535(a) 
showing that the service member's ability to fulfill the lease had been materially effected by his 
military service. 
The trial court recognized that undue hardship is not a controlling consideration under $535 
and engaged in analysis of the equities before it. In reaching its decision the trial court relied upon 
language in Omega Industries, Inc v. Raffaele, 894 F. Supp. 1425 (D. Nev. 1995) for the broad 
propositions that the SCRA is "always to be liberally construed" and applied in a "'broad spirit of 
gratitude"' towards service per~onnel.'~ And although the Omega case is a closer call (in Omega the 
Plaintiff's alleged equitable estoppel and that the defendant joined the service solely to take 
advantage of the SCR.4) the trial court followed Omega's example of weighing equitable 
considerations in favor of service members. The trial court took the proper considerations into 
account and reached a judgment within its equitable discretion. The trial court's judgment should 
be upheld on appeal. 
780mega, 894 F. Supp. at 1434, quotingpatrikes, 41 N.Y.S.2d at 166 
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ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
This Court should award Defendants their attornev fees and costs. 
Defendants were awarded attorney fees and costs at the trial court level pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 12-120(3). Plaintiff has not appealed this award and § 12-120(3) mandates the award of 
attorney fees at both the trial level and on Costs are awardable to the prevailing party 
pursuant to Idaho R. App. Pro. 40(a). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not condition its denial of equitable relief upon a showing of fraud. The 
court acted within its equitable discretion in protecting Plaintiffs rights under Section 535 of the 
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act. Plaintiffs appeal should be denied and Defendants awarded their 
costs and attorney fees. 
MSPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21" day of December, 2009. 
CAREY PERKrNS LLP 
I 
Attorneys for ~ e f e n d a n t s - ~ e s p n d e n t s  
79~sser  Elec v. Lost River Ballistic Technologies, Inc., 145 Idaho 912,921 (2008). 
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